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believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the punishment at life imprison-
ment! Paragraph four also refers only to the aggravator.This
juxtaposition of paragraphs and phrases, most of which refer
only to the aggravator, may lead to a potential misunder-
standing of the instruction. 9
The dissent reasoned that the instruction, when read
in its entirety as the jury would have received it, could rea-
sonably be read to say,"If you find the defendant eligible for
death, you may impose the death penalty, but if you find
(on the basis of 'all the evidence') that death penalty is not
'justified,' which is to say that the defendant is not eligible
for the death penalty, then you must impose life imprison-
ment 40 The dissent went on to say that "[wlithout any fur-
ther explanation, the jury might well believe that whether
death is, or is not, 'justified' turns on the presence or
absence of Paragraph 2's aggravating circumstances [ ]-
not upon the defendant's mitigating evidence ... 41
The majority concluded that even if the instruction was
deficient for not pointing out the existence of the mitigat-
ing evidence presented at trial, the jury was more than
aware of this evidence.The dissent stated, however, that"the
presentation of evidence does not tell the jury that the evi-
dence presented is relevant and can be taken into
"Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 764 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
41Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
11id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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account-particularly in the context of an instruction that
seems to exclude the evidence from the universe of rele-
vant considerations 42
After this case, defense counsel in Virginia should con-
tinue to object to the use of Virginia Model Criminal
Instruction 34.125 as vague, confusing, and insufficient to
adequately guide the discretion of the jury. If this objection
is overruled, counsel should insist that Virginia Model
Criminal Instruction 34.127, or a similar general mitigating
evidence instruction, be used as well. Virginia Model
Criminal Instruction 34.127 explicitly requires the jury to
consider "any evidence presented of circumstances which
do not justify or excuse the offense but which in fairness or
mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpa-
bility and punishment . 3 Further, defense counsel should
continue requesting specific instructions on the statutory
mitigating factors relevant in their case. The Buchanan
Court only held that giving an instruction on mitigating evi-
dence is not constitutionally required.Trial judges, however,
are not prohibited from giving such instructions and may, in
their discretion, choose to do so in any case.
Summary and analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
42
1d. at 766 (Breyerj., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
°Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No.
34.127 (1993 & Supp. 1995) & Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 765-66
(BreyerJ., dissenting).
LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY
117 S.Ct. 1517 (1997)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted in Florida state
court on two counts of first-degree murder for the 1983
killing of a man and woman who, after meeting Lambrix
and his girlfriend at a local tavern, had returned to his trail-
er for dinner.' In the sentencing phase of the trial, the trial
court instructed the jury on five aggravating circum-
stances. 2 One such instruction involved the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) aggravator3 The jury
issued an advisory sentence of death for each count of mur-
der, and the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both
'Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct. 1517,1521 (1997).
2Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1524.
-Id. at 1521.
counts after finding five aggravating factors with respect to
the murder of one of the victims, four aggravating factors
with respect to the murder of the other victim, and no mit-
igating factors with respect to either murder. The Florida
Supreme Court upheld Lambrix's convictions and sen-
tences on direct appeal.
4
Lambrix made multiple attempts to obtain collateral
relief, all of which were subsequently denied. He next sought
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, which rejected all of his
claims. He appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.' While that appeal was pending, the
4Id.
'Id.
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United States Supreme Court decided Espinosa v. Florida,6
which, because Florida constituted a"weighing" state, bore on
Lambrix's claim regarding the improper jury instruction on
the HAC aggravator.7 Lambrix contended that the jury instruc-
tion as to the HAC aggravator provided insufficient guidance
to limit the jury's discretion and that the trial court's subse-
quent independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances did not cure this error." The court of
appeals held Lambrix's habeas proceedings in abeyance to
allow Lambrix to assert his Espinosa claim in Florida state
court.' The Florida Supreme Court deemed Lambrix's
Espinosa claim procedurally barred and rejected it without
considering its merits. 10 Lambrix returned to the court of
appeals, which declined to acknowledge the procedural bar
issue and instead solely considered Lambrix's Espinosa claim.
The court of appeals determined that Espinosa constituted a
new rule that, under the edict of Teague v. Lane," could not
be applied retroactively. 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 3
HOLDING
While noting that courts ordinarily should consider proce-
dural bar issues before proceeding to constitutional issues, the
Court declined to resolve the procedural bar issue and instead
decided the case on Teague grounds. 4 In a majority opinion
penned by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the rule of
Espinosa v.Florida was not"dictated"bypre-existing precedent
when the defendant's conviction became final and, instead, that
the rule constituted a"new rule" incapable of retroactive appli-
cation under Teague." In so holding, the Court set forth the tri-
partite inquiry that federal habeas courts should make in con-
6505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (holding that in a "weighing" state in
which a judge is required to give deference to a jury's recom-
mended sentence, the Constitution disallows both the judge and
the jury from weighing impermissible aggravating circumstances).
7Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1521.
8Id. at 1524.
9Id. at 1522.
" e supreme court found that by requesting a limiting
instruction on the HAC instruction, Lambrix had preserved the
issue at trial. However, his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal
resulted in its procedural default. Id.
"1489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that "new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not become applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced").
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
"'Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1522.
13117 S.Ct. 380 (1996).
'4Lambrtx, 117 S.Ct. at 1523-24.The Court briefly discussed the
procedural bar issue and suggested that the arguments asserted by
Lambrix in response to the state's contention that his claim was pro-
cedurally barred seemed"insubstantial: Id at 1523. Citing the"inde-
pendent and adequate state ground" doctrine and its underlying
principles of federalism and comity; the Court suggested that a state
court could more properly resolve such a claim and should do so
before proceeding to constitutional issues. The Court ultimately
declined to rule on the procedural bar issue. Id. at 1522-24.
"Id. at 1525.
ducting a Teague analysis.'6 Finally, the Court found that
Lambrix's case did not fal within either exception to the bar
against retroactivity and, thus, that lambrix could not avail him-
self of the rule enunciated in Espinosa'
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ANALYSIS/APPIJCATION IN VIRGINIA
1. The Court's Strained Teague Analysis of Espinosa
"Dictates" a Closer Look
In Iambrb. the Court noted that Espinosa"did not purport
to rely upon any controlling precedent" and suggested that this fact
controlled its Teague assessment of the case." The Court's inter-
pretation of the substance of Espinosas holding was also determi-
native of the result it reached. The majority opinion stated that
Espinosa "central conclusion" was that "indirect weighing of an
invalid aggmvator 'creates the same potential for arbitrariness' as
direct weighing of an invalid aggravator" 19Yet, the Court proceed-
ed to cite cases standing for the proposition that jurors' considera-
tion of improper aggravators could be cured by appellate review,
and then concluded that these cases did not dictate the result
reached inEspinosa.in making that argumentthe Court argued by
implication that Espinosa's holding stood contrary to the previ-
ously accepted proposition that errors involving improperly vague
instructions on aggravators could be cured on appellate reviewAs
the final step in its analysis, the Court set forth three other conclu-
sions regarding the dictates of the law that reasonable jurists could
have made at the time that Iambrix's sentence was issued.?
"TOhe court must first determine the date upon which a defendant's
conviction became final Next, the court must consider whether the then-
existing legal landscape and precedent would have compelled the con-
clusion by the state court that the rule sought by the defendant was com-
pelled by the Constitution.iastay, if the court determines that the decision
enunciated a new rule, the court must decide whether the petitioner's
case fits within one of the two exceptions to the bar against retroactivity.
Lambix, 117 S.Ct at 1524-25.The first exception allows for the retroactive
application of a rule"if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond
the power of the State to proscribe.. .or addresses a'substantive categori-
cal guarante[e] accorded by the Constitution,' such as a rule'prohibiting a
certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense"Id at 1530,1531 (citing Teague, 489 U.S.at 311 & quot-
ing Saffle v Parks, 494 U.S. 484,494 (1990) (quoting Penry vLynaugh, 492
U.S. 302,329-330 (1989))).The second exception covers"watershed rules
of criminal procedure" which implicate constitutional concerns of funda-
mental fairness and accuracy. Teague 489 U.S. at 311.
'7Lambrix, 117 S.Ct.at 1530-31.
"d. at 1525.
"Id. (quoting Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082). In this case, the indi-
rect weighing refers to a trial judge's consideration of a sentenc-
ing recommendation rendered by a jury after its improper consid-
eration of an invalid aggravator.
2'LambrL# 117 S.Ct. at 1527-29.The Court stated that a"reason-
able jurist" could have reached the following three conclusions:"(1)
The mere cabining of the trial court's discretion would avoid arbi-
trary imposition of the death penalty, and thus avoid unconstitution-
ality ... (2)There was no error for the trial judge to cure, since under
Florida law the trial court, not the jury, was the sentencer ... (3)The
trial courts weighing of property narrowed aggravaors and mitigator was
sufficiently independent of the jury to cure any error in the jury's con-
sideration of a vague aggravato'."Ia at 1527-28 (emphasis in original).
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The Court's standard for determining whether a defen-
dant should be permitted to avail him or herself of a favor-
able rule pushes the limits of Teague and virtually renders
inevitable the wholesale denial of capital defendants' sub-
stantively valid constitutional claims. After noting that
Lambrix's conviction became final before the Court decid-
ed Espinosa, the Court explained that its "principal task
[was] to survey the legal landscape as of that date, to deter-
mine whether the rule later announced in Espinosa was
dictated by then-existing precedent-whether, that is, the
unlawfulness of Lambrix's conviction was apparent to all
reasonable jurists "' 2' The Court clarified that the proper
inquiry was not whether Espinosa was a"reasonable inter-
pretation of prior law," but"whether no other interpretation
was reasonable."2 It is difficult to imagine a case in which
the members of the Court would collectively speculate and
agree that, indeed, all reasonable jurists would have agreed
at a certain time that a rule was absolutely dictated by
precedent.This rigid standard, with its overwhelming defer-
ence to state court decisions, essentially presupposes the
denial of defendants' claims.
IL The Importance of Arguing BothTeague Exceptions
In the face of a Teague analysis, defense counsel should
argue that the defendant's case falls within both exceptions.
The first exception covers rules that insulate a class of private
conduct from governmental proscription or provide sub-
stantive categorical guarantees for a particular class of defen-
dants.u It appears that in Lambrix, defense counsel contend-
ed only that Lambrix's case fell within the first exception, and
the Court flatly rejected this contention.4 The second excep-
tion covers "watershed rules of criminal procedure" that
implicate concerns of fundamental fairness and accuracy.25
Lambrix's counsel did not argue that Espinosa claims fall
within the second exception.26 The Court indicated that it
2id. at 1525 (emphasis in original).
2Id. at 1530 (emphasis in original).
"Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1530-31.The availability of a valid argu-
ment with respect to the first exception would seem to depend
directly upon the substance of the new rule at issue in a particu-
lar case.
'11d. at 1531.
"Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,495
(1990), the Court explained,"Although the precise contours of this
exception may be difficult to discern, we have usually cited
Gideon v. Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), holding that a defen-
dant has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal tri-
als for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule coming with-
in the exception."
216n contrast to the first exception, the success of arguments
with respect to the second exception would seem to depend
upon the defense counsel's characterization of the right embodied
in the new rule. Defense counsel must seek to characterize that
right as being so primary and fundamental as to constitute a
"watershed" right. One possible strategy may be to link the right
granted by the new rule to another right that the courts have
deemed (or seem more likely to deem) a"watershed" right.
would not have been receptive to such an argument.27
However, as a general proposition, in striving to obtain for a
defendant the benefit of a"new rule," defense counsel should
construct arguments for both exceptions.
m. The Dissent's Compelling Case for Retroactive
Application of Espinosa
Justices Stevens' dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, set forth a compelling dissent
which disputed the majority's analysis of both the meaning of
Espinosa and the legal landscape at the time that Lambrix's
conviction became final.The dissent concluded that, in fact,
precedent did dictate the rule announced in Espinosa.'
According to the dissent, the Court succeeded in qualifying
Espinosa as a new rule incapable of retroactive application
only by interpreting Espinosa's holding in an unreasonably
broad manner.2 Justice Stevens stated as follows:
The majority apparently construes Espinosa as hold-
ing that the constitutional error in a jury instruction
will 'automatically render a defendant's sentence
unconstitutional'... But in holding that a trial judge's
sentence may be infected by the jury's consideration
of an invalid aggravating factor, Espinosa did not
address the entirely separate question of whether
the jury's error could be cured or considered harm-
less either at the trial or the appellate level."
The dissent argued that by imposing a "novel interpre-
tation" upon Espinosa's holding, the majority was able to
manipulate its selection of legal precedent and thus cast
doubt upon whether the rule announced in Espinosa was
dictated by precedent.31
The dissent's compelling argument reveals the extent to
which the majority was willing to stretch its analysis to reach
what is ostensibly the desired result-the denial of relief to
defendants whose constitutional claims are otherwise valid.
The majority's assessment of Espinosa's holding appears on
its face to be more generous toward defendants but, in actu-
ality, was crafted for purposes of defining it as a"new rule.""
By improperly broadening the holding of Espinosa, the Court
succeeded in denying virtually all prospective claimants the
benefit of its retroactive application.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Duprey




3'Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1532.
3 The Court interpreted Espinosa's holding as dictating that a
jury's consideration of invalid aggravating factors automatically
renders the defendant's sentence unconstitutional.With that facial-
ly defendant-friendly interpretation of the holding, the Court
deprived many potential claimants of the ability to avail them-
selves of Espinosa's rule.
